Outlook for Negotiations on Climate Change Framework after COP29 and the Inauguration of the Trump Administration

At COP29, each country and region deployed negotiation tactics prioritizing their own interests. However, at the core, it is assumed that there are strategies to plan decarbonization while balancing the 3Es (environment, economic efficiency, and energy security) based on the specific circumstances of each country and region (Figure 1).

The current funding target of 100 billion dollars per year was originally set for 2020 but was extended to 2025 due to it not being achieved. It was finally achieved in 2022 (Figure 2). Based on this, it can be said that achieving the funding target of 300 billion dollars per year, as decided in COP29, will not be easy.

The discussions leading up to COP29 regarding financial support mainly focused on the scale of funding, with less discussion on the content of financial support. Moving forward, there is room for consideration of proposals from a broader perspective, such as the “Expanded JETP (Just Energy Transition Partnership)” proposed by the European think tank Bruegel, as a feasible plan. The operation of JETP, established in 2021 by a group of developed countries, has begun, and it is currently supporting coal phase-out plans in countries such as South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam. It is a scheme that aims to develop ambitious plans for energy transition and provide substantial financial support to achieve them. However, there have been concerns raised about insufficient financial contributions from developed countries to JETP.

On the other hand, there are voices calling for COP reform, as the COP meetings have not been able to achieve the necessary results at a sufficient speed. On November 15th during the COP29 session, 22 environmental experts including Ban Ki-moon, former UN Secretary-General and Johan Rockström, the proponent of “planetary boundaries,” sent an open letter to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and others, raising this issue (Table 3). Considering the background leading up to COP29, proposals (1) to (4) can be considered urgent tasks.

Table 3: Proposals of COP reform by environmental experts

Item	Content
(1) Improve the selection process for COP presidencies	Need strict eligibility criteria to exclude countries which do not support the phasing out of fossil fuels.
(2) Streamline for speed and scale	Must be transformed into smaller, more frequent, solution-driven meetings where countries discuss solutions for finance and technology, etc. (shifting away from negotiations to concrete action).
(3) Improve implementation and accountability of national targets	Must strengthen mechanisms to hold countries accountable for their climate targets (including transparent tracking of pledges and action).
(4) Ensure robust tracking of climate financing	Need redefinitions and criteria for climate finance and implementation of tracking mechanism (with concerns over increasing interest-bearing loans to developing countries).
(5) Amplify the voice of science	Must have permanent scientific advisory bodies at COP (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is not a permanent one, while biological diversity COP has its own permanent one).
(6) Recognize the interdependencies between poverty, inequality and environment	Need a “Climate-Poverty Policy Envoy” (to ensure policy discussions with emphasis on the linkage between poverty, equality and climate).
(7) Enhance equitable access	Must enhance transparency and guidance on issuing access passes to COP (at COP 28, a record number of 2,456 fossil fuel lobbyists were granted access).

President Trump had promised to review the domestic decarbonization policies and withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and signed the executive orders on these issues on the day of inauguration (Figure 3). Firstly, the review of the decarbonization policies will work in the direction of increasing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, making it uncertain whether the United States will achieve its 2030 target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 50 to 52% (compared to 2005 levels). If the emissions from the second-largest emitter in the world, the United States, start to increase, it will exert upward pressure on global emissions as a whole. Secondly, the amount of financial support from the United States to developing countries will decrease significantly, which will reduce the feasibility of achieving the targets for many developing countries that have set their emission reduction goals based on the assumption of financial support.

Figure 3: Policies of the Trump administration and its impact

(1) Outlook for greenhouse gas emissions pathways

Hitachi Research Institute assumes three cases as pathways for greenhouse gas emissions towards 2030 (Table 4, Figure 4). It is quite difficult to further increase the 2030 emission reduction target to 43% compared to 2019 to achieve the “(1)1.5°C pathway” given the significant gap between the “(1)1.5°C pathway” and the current targets of each country, which are stacked up in the “(2)2.5°C pathway.” Additionally, it is becoming uncertain whether the “(2)2.5°C pathway” can be achieved. As mentioned earlier, with the backtracking of climate change measures in the United States and the possibility of insufficient financial support to developing countries, there is a possibility that the current targets of major emitting countries such as China, the United States, and India, as well as other emerging and developing countries, may not be achieved. Therefore, we set the “(3)3.5°C pathway” as the main case, where the current targets are not achieved. According to a report from the United Nations Environment Programme (dated October 24, 2024), it warns that if current policies are extended in each country, the average global temperature will rise by 3.1℃.

Table 4: Three cases for pathways of greenhouse gas emissions

Case	Greenhouse gas emissions in 2030	Feasibility(%)	Corresponding scenarios by other institutions	Decarbonization market (annual, trillion dollars)
(1) Paris Agreement achieved: 1.5°C pathway	On the path to achieving the Paris Agreement’s goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 (43% reduction compared to 2019)	Less than 20	IEA Net Zero Scenario (NZE)	3.5
(2) Paris Agreement not achieved: 2.5°C pathway	Achieving the current targets submitted (5% reduction compared to 2019)	30	IEA Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) [Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) is also relevant]	2.8
(3) Current target not achieved: 3.5°C pathway	Not achieving the current targets submitted (17% increase compared to 2019)	50	UNEP Current Policies Scenario	2.2

Figure 4: Historical and future trends in global greenhouse gas emissions

(2) Prospects for COP negotiations

A major milestone after COP29 is COP30 (November 2025, Brazil), where the next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for the period until 2035 will be submitted. The deadline for submitting the next NDCs is February 2025, but it is unlikely that developing countries, who are dissatisfied with the target amount of $300 billion in financial support, will submit ambitious reduction targets. As a result, the likelihood of the world as a whole following the pathway to achieve the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement (a 60% reduction by 2035 compared to 2019) is low.

Researchers and others have begun to propose revising the normative vision of the 1.5°C target, which is maintained in COP negotiations and policy discussions in various countries. For example, the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Public Policy has listed the following three options as choices for temperature targets. Option 2 is “returning to an achievable temperature target (e.g., a 2°C target) and prioritizing a balance between emission reduction measures and adaptation measures.” It is important to note this possibility they present and there is room for consideration.

⇒Temperature target options (University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Public Policy):

1. (1) Maintain the goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, regardless of the feasibility of the 1.5°C target.
2. (2) Return to an achievable temperature target, such as the 2°C target, and prioritize a balance between emission reduction measures and adaptation measures.
3. (3) Steadily progress with climate change measures, but do not fixate on specific temperature targets.

However, amidst the increasing global average temperature and the frequent occurrence of extreme weather events caused by climate change, there is a low possibility of revising the 1.5°C target due to the political intention to maintain momentum in the COP process. Additionally, while COP30, where the discussion on emission reduction targets until 2035 will take place, there is a possibility that the momentum to review the 2030 targets may not increase, raising concerns that global attention will shift from 2030 to 2035.